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The 1965 Voting Rights Act: Some Wrongs Still Not Righted 
by Neal Devins 
ISSUES 
Thomas C. McCain, et al. 
v. 
Charles E. Lybrand, et al. 
(Docket No. 82-282) 
To be argued October 31, 1983 
When Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 
1965, many observers complacently pointed to in-
creasing number of enfranchised black voters and black 
public office holders and were satisfied the tides of 
discrimination were turning. In fact, the tides were turn-
ing more slowly than assumed. 
Today, eighteen years after the Act took effect, 
courts are still being called upon to interpret its key 
provisions. 
One of those provisions is section 5, which bars seve-
ral states, including South Carolina, from changing es-
tablished election procedures without first getting 
approval or ··preclearance" from either the Attorney 
General or the D.C. district court. 
But what constitutes preclearance under section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965? In deciding McCain v. 
Lybrand, the Supreme Court will answer that question by 
determining whether the Attorney General approved 
changes in the voting procedures of Edgefield County, 
South Carolina. 
The McCain case - by way of an inordinately messy 
fact pattern- will determine the respective responsibili-
ties of the Attorney General in reviewing section 5 sub-
missions and of state/local government in preparing 
section 5 submissions. Specifically, the Court will ad-
dress: 
I. Whether and under what circumstances the Attorney 
General's approval of changes in an election proce-
dure can serve as an implicit approval of any unal-
tered aspects of the earlier election procedure, and 
2. Whether and under what circumstances the Attorney 
General can make section 5 preclearance contingent 
on future occurrences. 
Neal Devins is a research associate at the Institute for Public 
Policy Studies, Vanderbilt Universit)', 1208 Avenue South, 
Nashville, Tennessee 37212; telephone (615) 322-8540. 
Issue No.5 
FACTS 
As stated in the 1978 Supreme Court decision, United 
States v. Sheffield Board of Commissioners, the Attorney 
General preclearance procedure was designed as an 
alternative to "case-by-case litigation [, which] had 
proved ineffective in large part because voting suits had 
been 'unusually onerous to prepare' and 'exceedingly 
slow' to produce results.'' (453 U.S. 110, 118) Section 5 
thus "[shifted] the advantages of time and inertia from 
the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." (I d. at 121) In 
effect, section 5 eliminates those inventive attempts to 
circumvent federal court dictates banning discrimina-
tory voting practices. 
Edgefield County, prior to the enactment of the 
Voting Rights Act, was governed by a three-member 
board of commissioners consisting of an elected supervi-
sor of roads and two members appointed by the gover-
nor. In 1966, the state legislature created a three-
member county council for Edgefield County with all 
three members elected at-large. Although this legislative 
measure was subject to preclearance, the state did not 
seek appropriate review. 
In 1971, the state passed an act which increased from 
three to five both the number of residency districts in 
and the number of council members from Edgefield 
County. This act was submitted to the Attorney General 
for preclearance. After requesting and receiving infor-
mation -including "a copy of the election statute now in 
force" -the Attorney General granted preclearance. In 
South Carolina, even though blacks were and still are a 
majority of the population - but less than a majority of 
eligible or registered voters - no black had ever been 
elected to the county council. 
In June, 1975, South Carolina enacted a law which 
transferred some powers from the state legi.slature to 
county officials. This Home Rule Act also afforded each 
county the opportunity to hold a referendum to deter-
mine whether to change its form of government. In the 
event no referendum were held, the county would "have 
the form of government including the method of elec-
tion, number, composition and terms of the governing 
body most nearly corresponding to the form in effect in 
the county immediately prior to that date.'' In August of 
1975, the Attorney General precleared the Home Rule 
Act "insofar as it authorizes each county and citv to hold 
a referendum on the question of the form of its govern-
ment.'' The Attorney General, howe\·er. noted that ad-
ditional preclearance would be required by each county 
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prior to ··adopt in~ <l form of" ~overnmenl under I his 
:\ct." For the Attornev (~eneral. such adoption umsli-
tuted a chan~e subject to preclearance. 
Edgefield Countv did not hold a referendum under 
the Home Rule An hut instead adopted an at-lar~e 
eleoion procedure which the Attorney Ceneral rdused 
to preclear. 
In April. 19HO, the election method in Ed~el"ield 
Countv was struck down as unconstitutional. Yet, this 
decision was nullified that year when the Supreme 
Court held in Cit1• o( Mobile I'. Boldi'Jl, (446 U.S. 55) I hat 
proof of discriminatory intent was necessarv in a voter 
dilution case. Because of this nullification. blacks in 
Edgefield Countv sought to invalidate the at-large elec-
tion scheme by arguing that the Attorney Ceneral re-
fused to preclear that election system. (Note: Due to the 
intervening amendment of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act prohibiting am procedure resulting in denial 
or abridgment of voting rights based on race, Edgefield 
County blacks are seeking to reinstate the April, 1980 
voter dilution judgment. This case is now before the 
South Carolina federal district court.) 
In May. 1982. the South Carolina district court 
upheld Edgefield Countv's at-large election scheme and 
that decision was appealed directlv to the Supreme 
Court. 
The voters had argued. unsuccessfully. that the 1971 
preclearance was limited to the changes in residency 
districts and number of council members. The district 
court, however. held that since the Attorney General 
had requested and had received "a copy of the election 
statute now in force," it was reasonable to assume that 
the Attorney General's review of the 1971 Act "encom-
passed all aspects of the Act, including the effect of the 
at-large with residency requirement voting that had 
been implemented in 1966." 
The district court also refused to honor the Attorney 
General's February. 1979 objection to at-large elections 
in Edgefield County, holding that the Home Rule Act 
resulted in no change in election procedures and thus 
was not subject to section 5 review. The court held that 
the Attorney General's limited approval of the Home 
Rule A.ct extended not onlv to the holding referendum 
(as explicitlv stated), but also to transfers of power which 
did not alter county voting procedures. To justify this 
holding, the court ruled that the Attornev General's 
conclusion that assignments of forms of government 
constituted a change subject to preclearance onlv ap-
plied to those assignments which resulted in a change in 
election procedures. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
In Edgefield Countv itself . . \fcCain mav ultimately be 
of little practical significance. The related voter dilution 
case may invalidate at-large elections under Section :? of 
the Voting Rights .-\ct. Yet . . \lcCain is \ery important 
insofar as it should establish parameters for understand-
ing the respective rights and responsibilities of both the 
Attorney (~eneral and state/local gm·ernment units 
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights :\ct. 
Although not requiring increased black political re-
presentation, section 5 shifted the burden ofjustifying a 
change in election procedures to the covered jurisdic-
tion. The McCain case will explicate the nature of the 
burden placed on covered jurisdictions as noted by the 
United States in an amicus brief. That brief states: "If 
jurisdictions are not required to identify changes, [such 
as the 1966 change made in Edgefield County] they will 
he encouraged to make ambiguous submissions and to 
attempt subsequently to exploit the ambiguities." On the 
other hand, it seems apparent that the Attorney General 
was provided with information detailing the 1966 elec-
tion procedure. 
McCain is also significant because it may hamper the 
Attorney General from giving limited preclearance to 
section 5 submissions. Under the district court view, the 
Attorney General could not give effect to his interpreta-
tion of the 1975 limited section 5 preclearance. At the. 
same time, since it is unclear whether Edgefield County 
changed its election procedures under the Home Rule 
Act, it might be inappropriate to grant the Attorney 
General unlimited authority to determine what consti-
tutes a change in election procedures under section 5. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Black Voters 
1. A preclearance submission, such as that made in 1971 
by Edgefield County, cannot result in approval of 
election procedures not contained in the submission. 
2. The Attorney General cannot be held to have notice 
of information not directly related to the terms of a 
preclearance submission. 
3. A state-to-county transfer of powers pursuant to a 
home rule statute necessarily is a change of proce-
dures subject to section 5 preclearance. 
-!. Courts should defer to the Attorney General's inter-
pretation of a limited section 5 preclearance. 
For Edgefield County 
1. A preclearance request extends to all information 
contained in the original submission and any other 
information procured at the request of the Attorney 
General. 
2. The Attorney General can onlv object to ··actual" 
changes in election procedures. 
3. There must be an explicit delineation of all limita-
tions desired bv the Attorney General in a section 5 
preclearance approval. 
For Amicus Curiae 
At the request of the Court, the United States filed 
an amicus curiae brief. The United States's argument 
was identical to that made by the black voters. 
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